Authority: High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur

Order Date: 18 June 2026 (Order Delivered)

Case Overview

  • Petitioner: DAV Public School, Korba (through its Principal, Subhash Block), a private unaided educational institution run by the Dayanand Anglo Vedic College Trust & Management Society and affiliated to CBSE.
  • Respondents: (1) Central Information Commission, (2) Central Public Information Officer (CPIO), South Eastern Coalfields Ltd (SECL), Korba, (3) Ajay Kumar Shrivastava (resident of Korba).
  • Writ Petitions: Four writ petitions were filed – WPC No. 3145/2020, WPC No. 3365/2020, WPC No. 65/2021 and WPC No. 862/2021. All raised identical questions of law and fact concerning the legality, validity and propriety of orders passed by Respondent No. 1 (the First Appellate Authority of SECL) in second appeals under the Right to Information (RTI) Act.
  • Relief Sought: In each petition the petitioner prayed for (i) a call for the entire record relating to the impugned orders, (ii) a writ quashing and setting aside the orders dated 28‑09‑2020 (Second Appeal Nos. CIC/SECFL/A/2019/600831, 600832, 600834) and 25‑09‑2020 (Second Appeal No. CIC/SECFL/A/2019/600373), and (iii) any other appropriate relief, including costs.
  • Background Facts:
  • The petitioner school entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) dated 27‑03‑2006 with SECL whereby SECL agreed to compensate the deficit arising from concessional fees charged to wards of its employees. The MoU is purely contractual and financial; it does not create ownership, control or substantial financing by SECL.
  • Respondent No. 3 (Ajay Kumar Shrivastava) filed RTI applications before the CPIO of SECL seeking information about internal administration and service matters of the school. The CPIO, despite knowing that the school is not a “public authority”, forwarded the applications to the school and later directed the school to furnish the information.
  • The school replied on 26‑10‑2018 and 31‑10‑2018, asserting that it is not covered by the RTI Act and citing judicial precedents that DAV institutions are private bodies.
  • The First Appellate Authority of SECL, on 03‑12‑2018, erroneously held the school to be a public authority and ordered it to provide the information. The school made a representation on 29‑12‑2018 seeking modification.
  • On 28‑09‑2020 the respondent (First Appellate Authority) treated the Principal as a “deemed Public Information Officer”, imposed a penalty of Rs 5,000 and passed an order quashing the school’s refusal to provide information. A similar order dated 25‑09‑2020 was passed in the fourth petition.
  • Legal Submissions:
  • Petitioner's counsel argued that the school is a private, self‑financed society, not owned, controlled or substantially financed by the State or SECL; therefore it is not a “public authority” under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act.
  • SECL’s counsel conceded that the MoU is limited to deficit reimbursement and does not amount to substantial financing; it supported the petitioner's view that the RTI provisions should not apply.
  • Respondent No. 3’s counsel (Mr Pratik Modi) contended that the school receives substantial financial assistance (approximately 40‑45 % of total expenditure) and that SECL’s representation on the Local Managing Committee (LMC) confers control, relying on D.A.V. College Trust & Management Society v. Director of Public Instructions (2019) which held that such assistance can render an institution a public authority.
  • The Court examined a series of precedents: Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India (2005) (control test), Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) (financial dominance test), Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas (2003) (public function test), Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala (2013) (definition of “substantial financing”), and earlier Chhattisgarh judgments T. Vishnu (2024) and Bhuvneshwari Jaiswal (2015) which held DAV institutions are private bodies not subject to RTI.
  • Court’s Reasoning:
  • The school is a registered society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, administered by the DAV College Managing Committee, and generates its own funds through fees.
  • The MoU with SECL merely reimburses a deficit; it is not a regular grant‑in‑aid and does not constitute “substantial financing” as defined in Thalappalam (the assistance is not of a magnitude that the school would be financially dependent on SECL).
  • Presence of SECL officials on the LMC is advisory/facilitative and does not amount to “deep and pervasive” control required under Article 12 jurisprudence.
  • Consequently, the school does not satisfy any limb of the definition of “public authority” in Section 2(h) – ownership, control, or substantial financing – and therefore the RTI Act is inapplicable.
  • Since the school is not a public authority, the designation of the Principal as a “deemed Public Information Officer” under Section 5(4)‑(5) is legally untenable; the penalty imposed under the RTI Act is void.

Final Outcome

  • The Court held that the impugned orders dated 28‑09‑2020 and 25‑09‑2020 are illegal, arbitrary and beyond jurisdiction.
  • All four writ petitions (WPC Nos. 3145/2020, 3365/2020, 65/2021 and 862/2021) are disposed of; the orders are quashed.
  • No order as to costs was made.
  • The judgment is confined to the question of RTI applicability; other disputes remain open for appropriate remedies.

Topics: RTI Act, Public Authority Definition, Private Educational Institution