Authority: Supreme Court of India, Civil Appellate Jurisdiction

Order Date: 18 September 2026

Case Overview

  • Parties: Appellants – S. Panchalingu & Ors.; Respondents – People’s Education Trust (R) & Others.
  • Nature of Proceeding: Civil Appeal (arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 25577‑25579 of 2025) challenging the Karnataka High Court’s judgment dated 25 June 2025.
  • Background: The Karnataka High Court had set aside an order dated 2 May 2025 of the Principal District & Sessions Judge, Mandya, which had constituted an ad hoc committee of existing trustees to manage the affairs of the Trust pending further directions. The High Court reaffirmed its view that a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) is “stillborn” without leave and that the civil court lacks jurisdiction to pass interlocutory orders, including the appointment of a receiver, during the pendency of the leave application.
  • Substantial Question of Law: Whether a civil court, seized of a plaint filed under Section 92 CPC together with an application for leave, can pass protective or preservatory interim orders pending the grant of leave.
  • Conflicting High Court Opinions: Allahabad, Bombay, Kerala and Madras High Courts have recognised such protective jurisdiction; Orissa and Karnataka High Courts have taken the opposite view.

Arguments – Appellants

  • Senior counsel Dr. Aditya Sondhi argued that once the court is seized of a Section 92 application, it retains power to appoint a receiver under Section 94 read with Order XL Rule 1, and also under its inherent jurisdiction under Section 151.
  • Cited Section 141 CPC, which makes procedural provisions applicable to miscellaneous proceedings, and Rule 16‑A of the Karnataka Civil Rules of Practice (1967) treating the leave application as an independent substantive petition.
  • Emphasised that Order XL Rule 1 authorises appointment of a receiver over “any property” before or after decree, and that the omission of the phrase “in a suit” widens jurisdiction.
  • Relied on precedents from Bombay, Allahabad, Kerala and Madras High Courts supporting protective jurisdiction, and on the Supreme Court’s decision in Manohar Lal Chopra vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal (1962) affirming inherent powers.
  • Asserted that a receiver’s role is preservatory, not adjudicatory, and therefore does not prejudice the “stillborn” doctrine.

Arguments – Respondents

  • Senior counsel Mr. Raghavendra S. Srivatsa and counsel Mr. Amit Pai contended that the leave application is a threshold proceeding, not a substantive suit, and that Order XL Rule 1 presupposes an existing suit.
  • Highlighted that the phrase “with the leave of the Court” in Section 92 is sui generis and not qualified by “having obtained”, distinguishing it from other leave provisions.
  • Cited the Law Commission’s 54th Report recommending amendment of Section 91 but not Section 92, underscoring legislative intent.
  • Argued that the High Court’s order lacked any urgent circumstance justifying a receiver and that the application was filed on the eve of summer vacation, indicating lack of bona fides.
  • Pointed out that “supplemental proceedings” under Section 94 require an underlying proceeding, which is absent before leave is granted.
  • Relied on Vareed Jacob vs. Sosamma Geevarghese (2004) that interim relief under Section 94 is only available when the prescribed rules are satisfied, otherwise the court must rely on inherent power under Section 151.

Reasoning

1. Statutory Framework: Section 26 CPC requires a plaint for institution of a suit; Section 92 makes leave a mandatory pre‑condition, converting the suit into a “stillborn” proceeding until leave is obtained.

2. Nature of Section 92: It is a special provision balancing protection of public trusts with prevention of vexatious litigation; therefore, its safeguards are substantive, not merely procedural.

3. Threshold Proceeding: The leave application is a “threshold” proceeding; no interlocutory orders can be entertained until leave is granted because there is no lis.

4. Supplemental Proceedings: Section 94’s “supplemental” character presupposes an existing suit; it cannot be invoked to bypass the leave requirement.

5. Section 141: Applies only to procedural aspects of miscellaneous proceedings and cannot override the substantive safeguards of Section 92.

6. Inherent Power (Section 151): General inherent jurisdiction cannot derogate from the special provision of Section 92; the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant applies.

7. Urgent Relief Exception: While the court may dispense with prior notice in compelling urgent cases, it still cannot appoint a receiver before leave because such appointment is intrusive and defeats the protective purpose of Section 92.

Final Outcome

  • The Supreme Court held that a civil court seized of a plaint under Section 92 CPC together with a leave application is not empowered to pass protective or preservatory interim orders pending disposal of the leave application.
  • The Court allowed an exception for urgent relief where notice may be dispensed, but emphasized that such situations are rare and must be recorded in writing.
  • Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed; any pending applications, if any, are to stand disposed of.

Topics: Legal Procedure, Civil Procedure Code, Public Trust Litigation